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Abstract. Critical infrastructures are bringing security, and safety for people in 
terms of healthcare, water, electricity, industry, transportation, etc. The huge 
amount of data produced by CIs need to be aggregated, filtered, and stored. 
Cloud computing was merged into the CIs for utilizing cloud data centers as a 
pay-as-you-go online computing system for outsourcing services for data 
storage, filtering and aggregating. On the other hand, CIs need real-time 
processing for providing sophisticated services to people. Consequently, fog 
computing is merged into CIs aimed at providing services closer to the users, 
turning into a smooth real-time decision making and processing. When 
considering both, that is fog and cloud (for example, deploying the recently 
coined hierarchical fog-to-cloud F2C concept), new enriched features may be 
applied to the CIs. Security in CIs is one of the most essential challenges since 
any failure or attack can turn into a national wise disaster. Moreover, CIs also 
need to support quality of service (QoS) guarantees for users. Thus, bringing 
balanced QoS vs security is one of the main challenges for any CI 
infrastructure. In this paper, we illustrate the benefits of deploying an F2C 
system in CIs, particularly identifying specific F2C security requirements to be 
applied to CIs. Finally, we also introduce a decoupled security architecture 
specifically tailored to CIs that can bring security with reasonable QoS in terms 
of authentication and key distribution time delay. 
Keywords: Critical infrastructure; Quality of Service; Security; Fog-to-Cloud; 
Fog Computing; Cloud Computing 
1 Introduction and Motivation 
Critical infrastructures (CIs) [1] play a vital role in the world impacting on the whole 
economy, security, and health provisioning. CIs are a set of assets, be it either 
physical or virtual, providing country’s essential requirements and directions when 
any failure can cause a disaster in terms of security, economy or health. Nowadays, 
the Internet of Things (IoT) concept is merged into different CIs [1] such as hospitals, 
transport, nuclear plants, etc. Indeed, many sensors and actuators are utilized in CIs to 
facilitating the collection of distributed information from different locations to be 
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analyzed for CIs. For example, a hospital uses distributed temperature sensors to 
collect temperature information for providing comfortable environment for patients. 
A nuclear system uses sensors and actuators to collect information from a nuclear 
station to be checked aimed at preventing any nuclear radiation. However, the 
expected huge volume of data produced by IoT devices in CIs must be filtered, 
aggregated, and stored, thus requiring the right technology and infrastructure to do so. 
Cloud computing [2], as a pay-as-you-go online system provides datacenters for data 
processing, filtering, and storing. However, the conceptually far cloud cannot provide 
real-time processing, as required by CIs to provide services for people. Then, fog 
computing [3] appeared as a new concept which can be merged along with cloud to be 
used by CIs. Fog provides real-time processing, geo-distribution, security, etc., by 
handling services closer to the users. The fog computing concept was introduced as a 
complementary architecture leveraging cloud computing, rather than to compete with 
it. Inferred from this fog concept, the Fog-to-cloud (F2C) computing continuum 
system [4] recently emerged. This combined system allows services that demand real-
time processing to use fog, and in parallel, services demanding huge volume of data 
processing to use cloud. The envisioned F2C hierarchical architecture can be merged 
into the CIs to facilitate their dependency interactions and services execution.   
Certainly, it is widely accepted that a key challenge in the CIs world is security. 
Potentially, CIs are so dependable to bring safety and security for people. However, 
the larger the number of things (IoT devices) in CIs are, the larger the security and 
privacy risks will be. Indeed, IoT devices have limited computational power to handle 
cryptography and security provision by themselves. Therefore, IoT devices can be 
used by attackers to either launch the attack or get access to the collected information. 
These type of devices can be hacked or attacked in terms of passive and active 
attacks. The distributed nature of IoT devices brings a challengeable question, “can 
centralized cloud computing handle security requirements for the huge number of 
distributed devices at the edge of the network? “. There are many positive positive 
answers :“yes, cloud computing by means of powerful data centers and virtualization 
can handle security”. But then, the question is “why do CIs still suffer from attacks, 
such as the attacks to many hospitals, universities, transport systems in 2017?” 
Indeed, in 2017, one attack to a hospital in England stopped the hospital network 
system for 24 hours. In this case, casualties might be so terrible due to human’s life 
losses. On the other hand, there are also some negative answers: “Traditional, 
centralized and far away cloud computing is not suitable for handling the distributed 
devices security”. Then a different question can arise: “How can this security be 
provided?”. Some researchers rely on the emerging “fog computing” concept 
assuming that security can be handled closer to users (enhancing then the privacy as 
well) and in a distributed fashion. Nevertheless, in any case, centralized cloud and 
distributed fogs must be coordinated to deliver a safe and secure system.  
Consequently, CIs must consider a new strategy for handling security in this 
distributed and hierarchical fashion, because the centralized cloud as a single point of 
failure cannot be sufficient for handling security in dependable CIs. In this paper, we 
identified most potential security requirement in a F2C system to be applied into CIs 
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and propose a new security architecture. The proposed security architecture extends 
the work done in [5] by setting a transversal security architecture, decoupled from the 
underlying F2C system. To that aim, this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, 
we briefly introduce the F2C concept. In section 3, we revisit main security 
requirements in the cloud, fog and F2C domains, the proposed security architecture in 
section 4, the security architecture in CIs in section 5, evaluation and analysis section 
6, and finally, section 7 concludes the paper. 
2 F2C system 
Fig. 1. F2C Architecture 
 
F2C is a hierarchical multi-layered architecture conceived to cover a broad area, from 
the edge up to the cloud with plenty of computing devices. The hierarchical 
distributed nature of this architecture puts together the advantages of both computing 
paradigms, i.e., proximity at the fog and high performance at the cloud, leading 
towards a coordinated management of the whole system, and enabling an optimal 
resource allocation intended to meet the expected service QoS requirements. The 
envisioned F2C ecosystem [7], as shown in Figure 1, is organized into fog areas, each 
including its whole set of resources (nodes). The exact scope of an area and the 
individual allocation of resources into each area are topics of current research, 
certainly affecting the scalability of the system. One node at each area is selected to 
become the fog node as the manager of the fog area. The fog node as a manager, is a 
node with certain features, such as enough computing and networking capabilities to 
manage its area, and good network access, just to name a few. The responsibilities of 
such fog nodes are managing the devices inside the area as well as coordinating with 
higher level layers. In Fig. 1, the fog nodes as managers, are connected and managed 
by the Cloud layer, thus crafting the hierarchical architecture. Obviously, the cloud 
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layer has enough capacity to perform a higher level management of the fog nodes set. 
Additionally, in a large scenario with millions of devices and spanning several 
squared kilometers, such architecture could increase the number of layers in order to 
facilitate an efficient coordination between nearby areas and, thus, becoming a multi-
layered architecture. The multi-layered hierarchy guarantees the scalability of the 
system, as well as an efficient services management. Again, determining the number 
of layers for a specific ecosystem is a topic of current research and it is out of the 
scope of this paper, see [8]. The envisioned F2C scenario is enriched by considering 
users to play as both: i) users share their resources to the F2C system; ii) users 
become F2C clients requesting the execution of services or applications.   
To take advantage of the execution of services in this combination of the different 
computing paradigms, fog, edge and high performance at cloud, it is necessary a 
system controlling and managing the execution of services. The outlined 
characteristics in the execution of a service may be:  
• Launching the service: The service can be requested to the system in any node 
belonging to it.  
• Hierarchical search of resources: If the service is requested to a specific node:  
– For nodes not serving as fog node managers: if the node has enough 
resources to execute the service, it will be executed in this node; 
otherwise the request will be forwarded to its fog node (higher layer).  
– If the node is a fog node manager, it will also check if it has enough 
resources, but in this case, considering the resources of all the nodes 
belonging to the area it is controlling. Again, if in the area there are 
enough resources the service will be executed in the nodes of the area; 
otherwise the service will be forwarded to the higher layer, in the case of 
Fig. 1 to the cloud leader, but with more hierarchical layers to the 
corresponding upper layer.  
• Mapping of services and resources: The previous description about the 
hierarchical search of resources will be based on the smartness to map services 
into fog or cloud resources according to their capabilities, availability, 
expected QoS requirements, etc.  
• Distributed and parallel execution: The F2C system must allow the distributed 
execution of services. Services can be either monolithic applications or 
services divided into subservices or task. When a service allows its division 
into tasks, the F2C system must perform the best division into tasks and also 
assign the tasks to the more suitable resources. Moreover, this distributed 
execution may be also parallel in some services. Taking advantage again of the 
large number of nodes, different tasks of a service can be executed in different 
nodes. The F2C management system must be endowed with a runtime 
controller responsible for controlling the synchronized execution of tasks.  
Other main aspects of the F2C easing the distributed execution of services in this 
ecosystem are:  
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• Resource discovery: Nodes can be on the move in the city, such as mobile 
phones. A mechanism must exist to ease mutual discovery between leaders and 
normal nodes.  
• Identification: Nodes participating in the system must be uniquely identified.  
• Sharing model: users sharing their devices in the system should indicate the 
amount of resources they want to participate with (memory, storage, etc.).  
• Handover: As mentioned, nodes can be on the move, first belonging to an area 
and after some time steeping away of it. Thus there should be a handover 
mechanism to reallocate tasks being executed in these on the move devices.  
Critical infrastructure (CIs) can benefit from F2C system for providing hierarchical 
fog nodes in their system. It facilitates the services execution for CIs, without, or even 
increasing the security and the privacy of CIs’ data. Data from sensors must be 
analyzed in CIs to detect possible risks. With the proposed deployment of fog nodes 
and fog areas, these data do not need to be sent to cloud through Internet to be 
processed. The cluster of devices in a fog area, under the control of a fog node 
manager, can handle the execution of sensitive services in CIs. In that sense, higher 
privacy is guaranteed. This is especially important in CIS, because data treated is 
particularly sensitive, both in terms of security (for example information about a 
nuclear station) and also in terms of privacy (for example patients’ data in a hospital).   
On the other hand, if data is processed close to the sources of data, real-time 
processing is also guaranteed, and finally, network traffic to cloud is also decreased.  
Apart of the advantages of handling CIs services in a F2C system, the security itself 
should be managed by a distributed system instead of being managed by cloud. In this 
sense, in this paper we also propose a distributed and transversal security architecture, 
decoupled from the underlying F2C system to bring security with demanded quality 
of service (QoS) into the CIs. Next section will describe the specific requirements of 
this new proposed security architecture. 
3 Security requirements for combined CIs-F2C 
This section is aimed at describing the specific set of security requirements for F2C 
scenarios to be applied into CIs.  Security requirements in CIs must be analyzed to 
establish a secure, robust and trustable environment for the people. In fact, we 
categorize most common security requirements in CIs as follows [8]: strong network 
security management, strong identification and authentication mechanism, firm 
security  policy, data confidentiality, forensics analysis, operational technology (OT) 
protection, OT network protection, secure communication channel, anomaly 
behavior, detection mechanism, high network traffic detection mechanism (for 
DoS/DDoS attacks), security information and event management (SIEM), 
antimalware and antiviruses protection mechanism, hardware security, data privacy, 
data integrity, and IT network protection.  
Therefore, most potential security requirements must be considered for applying F2C 
system into CIs can be shown as (see [1], [9], [10], and [11]):   
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• Authentication: All components in a CIs system, such as users, edge devices, 
fog devices, gateways, services, and cloud service providers, must be 
authenticated not to allow access to unauthorized users. Thus, CIs systems need 
a new authentication mechanism to handle this hierarchical and distributed F2C 
system.  
• Key management: a well-structured key management strategy must be applied 
for keys distribution, update and revocation in CIs to provide secure 
communication between components. Indeed, a hierarchical and distributed F2C 
system requires a distributed key management strategy to be applied.   
• Identity management: all CIs components, such as edge devices, fog devices 
and cloud services must have a unique identity that might be updated or 
revoked.   
• Data security: all data storage, processing, aggregation, and sharing must be 
secured and encrypted between edge-fog-cloud (F2C) in CIs.  
• Network security: all communication in CIs components edge-fog-cloud (F2C) 
must happen in a secure way (i.e., encryption).   
• Access control: A well-defined distributed and hierarchical access control must 
be defining in CIs due to hierarchical F2C systems.  
• Devices and services discovery: edge devices, fog devices, and in parallel 
services for CIs must be discovered in a secure way to avoid attacks, such as 
eavesdropping, man-in-the-middle, and masquerade attacks.  
• Security management: a well-defined security analysis and management must 
be applied into CIs due to hierarchical nature of F2C system.  
• Distributed security architecture: Due to distributed nature of F2C systems, a 
new security architecture must be designed to handle a F2C system in a 
distributed and hierarchical way to be applied into CIs.  
• Secure bootstrapping: all edge devices, fog devices, and other devices 
participating in CIs must bootstrap in secure way to avoid any alteration or 
modification in devices in hierarchical F2C.   
• Integrity, confidentiality, and availability: Data and system in integrated CIs-
F2C must be integrated, confidential and made available to all users and 
participants.   
• Secure sharing computation: In a F2C system, edge devices might not be able to 
handle data processing, storage, and aggregation due to their low computational 
resources. Therefore, upper layers such as fog nodes or cloud resources must 
provide secure shareable computation to handle the required processing in CIs.  
• Secure mobility: CIs components, such as fog nodes and edge devices, might be 
on the move (mobility) and have dynamic characteristic. Therefore, secure 
mobility and secure and fast handover are both needed in F2C systems.  
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• Intrusion detection: Intrusion detection mechanisms must be applied in cloud as 
centralized point and in parallel, distributed way for fog layers in F2C-CIs 
system.  
• Privacy: In CIs such as healthcare, privacy is crucial security requirements. It 
means all the user’s information must have kept private. In F2C-CIs system, 
data processing, aggregation, communication, storage must be done in secure 
way to not disclose any private information, data leakage, data eavesdropping, 
data modifications, and etc. All data in channels must be encrypted and access 
to data must not be disclosed to unauthorized users.   
• Monitoring: A well-structure security monitoring in cloud and distributed 
security monitoring for distributed fogs must be applied in CIs-F2C system to 
analysis traffics and other variables and detect malicious activities.   
• Security management: Well-defined security requirement, policies, security 
controls configuration, and etc. must be applied in CIs-F2C system. One of 
main challenges here is managing security in distributed fog layers and edge 
devices (IoT devices).   
After illustrating security requirements in CIs for applying in an F2C system, we can 
conclude that the specific requirements and characteristics of combined CIs-F2C 
systems demand a novel architectural solution aimed at providing security. Next 
section describes a hierarchical security architecture suitable for security provisioning 
in CIsF2C systems.  
4 Security architecture for combined CIs-F2C 
   
Fig. 2. Security Architecture 
In a previous work, a security architecture (Fig. 2) was proposed for handling a 
hierarchical F2C approach. The security architecture [5] includes a centralized F2C 
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controller at cloud and distributed control-area-units (CAUs) at fog to provide 
security requirements in a hierarchical nature. The CAUs get authenticated and 
authorized from a F2C controller (at cloud) in an initialization phase. Then, CAUs 
can be trustable to act as distributed security controllers at fogs to provide security 
requirements for each corresponding areas. CAUs can provide security for fog 
devices, edge devices and even devices that do not have enough computational power 
to provide their security. This architecture eliminates single points of failure by 
deploying distributed CAUs. Other advantages of the envisioned architecture can be 
read as security management, distributed security provisioning, efficient key 
management, less-time delay authentication, hybrid cryptography using different 
keys, authentication mechanism in different layers, handling edge devices security 
with no computational power, secure mobility/handover, etc.  
The security architecture can be implemented as embedded inside of fog nodes or 
decoupled from fog nodes as transversal decoupled security architecture. The both 
scenario were tested in previous work [6]. The Decoupled CAUs F2C (DCF) scenario 
brings security with less impact on QoS as illustrated in Fig. 3.   
 
  
 Fig. 3.  Decoupled security architecture (DCF)  
 
In the proposed decoupled security architecture, all CAUs get authenticated and 
authorized from the F2C controller to handle security in their corresponding areas. In 
this case, security can be met with reasonable QoS and even CAUs are able to detect 
malicious fog nodes as they are not implemented inside of them.  
In this paper, CAUs act as authenticator and key managers for distributed fog areas at 
the edge of the network as illustrated in Fig. 4. The implemented DCF workflow is 
described as following: 
9 
• Initialization phase: In this process, all distributed CAUs authenticated and 
establish secure channel with certificate authority (CA) in the cloud.  
1- CAU sends certificate signature request (CSR) and its’ id (CAU-id) 
to the F2C controller. 
2- F2C controller checks the CAU-id existence in the list for validation 
if exists then, goes to the next step. (After id provider generate ids for 
CAU, it sends to F2C controller.). 
3- F2C controller sends signed certificate to the CAU. 
4- CAU and F2C controller are authenticated and transport layer 
security (TLS) establish for providing CAU-F2C controller secure 
channel. 
It is worth mentioning the fact that after fog nodes selection in the fog areas, all the 
described processes will run to provide fog node-CAU authentication and TLS 
establishment in the initialization phase. 
• Edge device authentication process: 
5- Edge device is registered in cloud. 
6- Id provider in the cloud, generates device-id. 
7- The id-provider sends device-id to the edge device. 
8-  In parallel, the device-id is sent to the CAU by id-provider for local 
id validation. 
9-  The edge device comes to the fog area and discovered by fog node. 
10-  The edge device sends CSR and device-id to the CAU. 
11-  CAU check the device-id existence for validation. If the device-id 
exists and validates then, goes to the next step 
12- CAU signs certificate and send signed certificate to the edge device. 
13- In parallel, CAU sends device id to the fog node. 
14-  Edge device and fog node are authenticated and establish TLS. 
• Key distribution, generation and management: 
15- Edge device sends request for keys 
16- CAU generates public key and private key. 
17- CAU sends key pairs in secure channel. 
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Fig. 4. DCF workflow 
In the next section, we illustrate the decoupled security architecture in dependable 
CIs.  
5 Decoupled security architecture in CIs 
In a critical infrastructure scenario that includes different CIs such as, smart 
healthcare, smart factory, smart transportation, etc. (Fig. 5), the security architecture 
can be applied as a transversal architecture to provide security requirements in a 
distributed fashion. In this scenario and with the decoupled security architecture 
proposed, we can think on security controllers (which we have called CAUs) 
deployed in the different areas handling the security of all type of CIs; or in an even 
more decoupled architecture with specialized SCs for each one of the CIs.   
In this second approach of specialized SCs, each smart component in each CI can use 
a certain number of specialized security controllers for each one of the CIs (smart 
Health, smart Transportation, etc.) as it is shown in Fig. 5. For example, smart 
healthcare might use security controllers for handling security according to the huge 
number of IoT devices in their environment. All distributed SCs have secure inter-
communication. In case of a controller failing, being compromised or attacked, the 
security controller at cloud may substitute the nearest and safest security controller in 
that area till a new security controller will be selected.   
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Fig. 5.  Critical infrastructure scenario   
This intercommunication between SCs can also help detect, counteract and react to 
possible cascading effects. The CIs are so dependable to each other. Therefore, any 
failure or compromise in one of them might affect the other. Thus, the proposed 
transversal architecture using distributed security controllers can bring secure 
dependency into the CIs (Fig. 6). Each one of the CIs might use different numbers of 
security controllers due to their infrastructure’s needs. All SCs get authenticated and 
authorized from the F2C controller at cloud, therefore, they have secure inter-
communication. This distributed SCs can bring trust into the CIs. For example, in 
case of an accident, a SC in healthcare can communicate with SC in transportation 
securely for getting patients information before patient arrives to hospital. Or in case 
of transportation accidents, SC in transportation system can securely communicate 
with emergency services to provide safety and security for people. 
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Fig. 6.  Critical infrastructure scenario  
One of the critical infrastructure issues refers to how smart city related concepts are 
managed, considering all involved infrastructures, some of them highly critical (e.g. 
transportation, healthcare, etc). When trying to deploy this security architecture in 
this smart city scenario with different CIs, the SCs might be embedded inside of 
different smart city’s component with high computational power (similar to the 
scenario shown in Fig. 3). However, these components might have another critical 
responsibility, such as real-time service execution, real-time data processing with 
low-latency, data aggregation and storing. Therefore, SCs embedded into the smart 
city’ devices might not be so suitable due to the high security processing usages 
which can impact on QoS in the smart city service to be executed. In this scenario, a 
decoupled transversal security architecture (similar to the scenario in Figure 4) as 
another dimension with separated components from smart city may be applied into 
the system to bring safety and security with the demanded QoS. 
This approach applied to a smart city scenario is shown in Fig. 7. The growth of IoT 
devices in a smart city for collecting information allows the execution of services 
aiming at easing people’s lives. With this amount of IoT devices security is being a 
challenge. However, a key question is “How do we provide security requirements for 
IoT-devices with low computational power?”. In our proposed architecture, we 
propose to distribute security controllers (SCs) into the city, hence each security 
controller is responsible for providing IoT-devices’ security requirements in its area. 
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Fig. 7. Smart secured city  
All security controllers have secure inter-communication with each other. In case of 
failing a SC, it is compromised, or attacked, the nearest safest SC is used as backup to 
provide security in that area till a new security controller is selected. The distributed 
security controllers are capable of providing security requirements such as key 
management, authentication, intrusion detection, abnormal behavior detection and 
etc. for distributed low-computational IoT devices in smart city. Therefore, smart city 
concept can be developed to “smart secured city” to ease people’s lives with safety 
and security.  
6 Results analysis 
In this paper, authentication and key distribution in two scenarios, such as traditional 
cloud authenticator and key manager and decoupled CAUs as distributed 
authenticator and key managers are implemented and analyzed as illustrated in Fig. 4 
and Fig. 8.  
The traditionally cloud workflow is described next (see also Fig. 8): 
• Edge device registration: 
1- Edge device registers to the cloud. 
2- Identity provider in the cloud generates device-id 
3- Cloud sends device-id to the edge device. 
• Edge-cloud authentication: 
4- Edge device sends CSR and id to the cloud. 
5- Cloud checks device-id if exists then signs the certificate. 
6- Cloud sends signed certificate to the edge device. 
7- Edge device-cloud authenticated and establish TLS. 
• Key distribution and management: 
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8- Edge device sends key request to the cloud. 
9- Cloud generates public and private keys by elliptic curve. 
10- Cloud sends pair keys in secure channel to the edge device. 
 
Fig. 8. Cloud authenticator and key manager workflow 
Both workflows (Fig. 4 and Fig. 8) are implemented in our smart city testbed. In 
traditional cloud, a Raspberry Pi 3 (RP3) is used as edge device and a server Fujitsu 
Primergy TX300 S8 acts as cloud and certificate authority (CA). In the cloud 
scenario, X.509 public key certificate is used for authentication and elliptic curve 
(ECC) is used for key generation. On the other hand, in the DCF workflow, a RP3 
acts as edge device, a RP3 as CAU which is located at the edge of the network, and 
finally a Primergy TX300 S8 server as cloud and F2C controller. In this scenario, 
X.509 is implemented in the F2C controller and CAU. Therefore, once the F2C 
controller-CAU is authenticated, the CAU gets authorization to provide 
authentication and key distribution for edge devices. Elliptic curve is implemented in 
the CAU to provide key generation and distribution. In both scenarios, we compute 
the time for edge-device authentication, key generation and distribution to the edge 
devices. Obtained results are shown in Table 1 and Table 2. 
Table 1. Authentication time delay 
Scenario Authentication time delay (MS) 




Table 2. Key generation and distribution time delay 
Scenario Authentication time delay (MS) 
Traditional cloud  59.613 
DCF 8.009 
 
As illustrated in the tables above, the DCF strategy can decrease authentication time 
delay almost 78 ms and for key generation and distribution can decrease almost 51 
ms. In this case, we can claim that the DCF strategy is more suitable for critical 
infrastructures by bringing security with less impact on the QoS in terms of time 
delay. 
7 Conclusion  
In this paper, we illustrate the benefits of merging the F2C system into the critical 
infrastructures. F2C systems allow the execution of CI services close to the devices 
providing the sensitive data, but not competing with cloud but collaborating each 
other. However, the use of a F2C system in CIs brings security challenges due to its 
hierarchical and distributed nature. We identify the most potential security 
requirements for deploying a F2C solution into CIs. On the other hand, security must 
be provided based on these requirements. To this end, we also propose a transversal 
and distributed security architecture to bring security into the CIs, without impacting 
in the requested QoS, referred to as DCF. This architecture is based on distributed 
security controllers (SCs) specialized in different CIs. Some CI scenarios are 
described for deploying the proposed security architecture into the CIs. Finally, the 
DCF workflow is implemented, validated and compared with traditional cloud in 
terms of authentication, key generation and distribution, showing its main benefits.  
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